Religious Discrimination – Fundamental distinction between someone’s religious beliefs and the manner in which they choose to express them. If the latter, then no religious discrimination.
Richard Page -v- NHS Trust Development Authority UKEAT/0183/18/DA
The Claimant, who is a practising Christian, held the position of Non-Executive Director of an NHS Trust. He was also a lay magistrate sitting on family cases involving adoption decisions. The Claimant holds the firm faith-based belief that it is “not normal” for a child to be adopted by a single-parent or a same-sex couple. The public expression of those views led to disciplinary action in respect of his Magistracy. The Claimant participated in media interviews about that action without informing the Trust. The Trust instructed the Claimant to inform it before contacting the media. The Claimant was subsequently removed from the Magistracy. Before the Trust could speak to him about that removal, the Claimant took part in a further televised interview with BBC Breakfast News, during which he expressed the view that he could not see how adoption by a same sex-couple could ever be in the best interests of the child. The Claimant was thereafter suspended by the Trust and his term as a NED was not renewed. The Claimant issued claims of discrimination (direct and indirect) because of religious belief and victimisation. The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claims.
Held (dismissing the appeal): that the Tribunal had not erred in law in finding that the Claimant was treated as he was because of the manner in which the Claimant had expressed his beliefs (rather than because of the beliefs themselves), including the fact that he had spoken to the media without informing the Trust and had done so in the knowledge that his conduct would be likely to have an adverse effect on the Trust’s ability to engage with sections of the community it serves. That finding as to the reason for the Claimant’s treatment was a finding of fact which cannot be said to be perverse. The Tribunal had also not erred in rejecting the claim of indirect discrimination on the grounds that the Claimant was unable to show group disadvantage. The Tribunal had correctly applied the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mba v Merton London Borough Council  1 WLR 1501. Finally, the Tribunal had not erred in concluding, in accordance with the principles established in Martin v Devonshires Solicitors  ICR 352, that the various reasons relied upon by the Respondent for its treatment of the Claimant were properly separable from the allegations of discrimination which the Claimant was making against the Lord Chancellor and others in respect of his removal from the Magistracy.